Introduction
In Galileo, Darwin and Hawking: The Interplay of Science, Religion and Reason, Phil Dowe makes an argument in attempt to reconcile God with the chance worldview, which states that the world exists in a chaotic, unpredictable state. Here is a brief summary of strengths and weaknesses his argument holds.
Summary
Dowe basically concludes that either God causes chance or that He does not, and that neither result should pose a significant problem for theists. If an event has meaning, it is caused by God, if an event is inconsequential, then it is by chance.
He begins by introducing the Calvinist belief, which is that God is the cause of all things. He then contrasts this view with deism, which says that God set the world in motion and walked away. He makes the argument that though the world could appear to be made in a deistic way, that this may only apply to the way the world works and chance occurs, and does not rule out the personal God.
He then delves into Bell's theory, which apparently says that determinism is false. However, this theory would not apply to God, because God exists without limitation of locality. He finally comes to the conclusion, as already stated, that God is responsible for chance, unless it is of no consequence.
Strengths
The strength of the argument lies in the fact that it is difficult to refute, or that there are ways to work around conclusions about chance which still provide for a provident and all-knowing God. If one argues that chance happens by nature, and God is not the cause of it, there is not an argument that God is not working in the world. "And we know that in all things God works for the good of those who love him, who have been called according to his purpose" (Romans 8:28). There is also the fact that no one can say with certainty that chance actually exists, for it is not impossible that God is the cause of everything that is interpreted as chance, and people simply do not understand it. Also, even if the providential God could be disproven, the personal God could not.
The idea of chance seemingly rules out the possibility of God being all-knowing. However, this is not necessarily true. Now, this may stretch the mind a bit, but try to follow this train of thought. God is all-knowing, and the Bible says, "All the days ordained for me were written in your book before one of them came to be" (Psalm 139:16). The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines chance as, "something that happens unpredictably without discernible human intention or observable cause." It says that chance is something that "happens;" a happening is an event, and an event implies time. God exists outside of time, so it is possible for God to have knowledge of a chance occurrence. It is not a concept easily grasped, and some might say it makes no sense at all.
Weaknesses
There are weaknesses when combining the idea of God with the idea of chance. One already addressed above. Another is that chance implies that God is not in control of everything. This poses a problem for those who believe in absolute providence.
A weakness is that the Bible does say, "All the days ordained for me were written in your book before one of them came to be" (Psalm 139:16). One could say that this passage says there is not chance. It does not say, "All the significant, consequential events that happen in my life were written in your book..." It says "All the days," which, one could argue, includes those inconsequential events which Dowe says are due to natural chance.
Dowe uses John Polkinghorne's theory that chance occurs in the universe and God "goes with the flow." God creatively responds to the chance occurrences. This almost makes it seem like a game--like the universe is some sort of cosmic pinball game--God sets the ball (the universe) into play, it is bounced around by the obstacles (chance), and He makes certain it stays in play. If this is the way things are, then Calvary makes no sense. The gift of Jesus Christ shows a God who loves the world, not a God who plays pinball with the world.
Conclusion
This is just a brief overview of a very complex argument. It is obvious that this paper only scratches the surface of Dowe's argument, and much more could be said. Dowe's example in quantum physics can easily go over the head of many readers, hence this paper's general focus on the philosophical part of the argument, rather than the physical. Nevertheless, it is the hope of this writer that this paper provided some insight to Dowe's argument of reconciling God and the chance worldview.
