Philip Jahnke
Honors Program
Directed Writing Six
God and Chance
In his chapter God and Chance, Phil Dowe discusses whether or not God and chance can coexist and "Bell's Theorem for the relation between divine and natural causation". First, Dowe writes about chance as a possible worldview and the history of chance as a worldview. Chance as a worldview has an essential element which is a metaphysical claim. This claim is "that our universe is intrinsically chaotic in the sense that its development from moment to moment is sometimes a matter of chance" (170). This means that the world does not have complete idea of what is going to happen to it next. Dowe goes on to say that a chance worldview is not new to the world, but that, "the chance worldview, in our intellectual history, stands in quite stark contrast to the 'rational worldview,' which has dominated Western thought since the seventeenth century" (171). This worldview is defended by seventeenth century philosopher Leibniz believed that God designed the world. Leibniz based his philosophy on the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The Principle of Sufficient Reason says, "everything has a reason why it is the way it is rather than some other way" (171). In the nineteenth century, probability became part of science. Dowe writes that, "this is not necessarily a blow to determinism, because probability can be interpreted as a matter of ignorance -- meaning just that we don't know what the underlying reasons and causes are" (172).
Next, Dowe discusses providence. He says, "Providence is a theological concept concerned with the continuing action whereby God preserves and protects the world" (173). Absolute providence is an idea presented by John Calvin which states that "'Single events are so regulated by God and all events so proceed from his determinate counsel, that nothing can happen fortuitously'" (173). Dowe goes on to say that in absolute deterministic providence there are three claims: God is the necessary cause of every event and every aspect, God is the sufficient cause of every aspect and every event, and God provides complete reason.
The next section of this chapter discusses Quantum Chance. Dowe writes that "'Chance' refers to single-case objective chance" (178). Dowe goes on to say that determinism, or providence, and chance exclude each other. This idea is supported by Bell's Theorem. In Bell's theorem there are no hidden variables and a complete description of the full story is possible. According to Bell's theorem, determinism is proven false, and there can now be genuine chance in the world.
In the sections of the chapter, Dowe goes on to show a loophole in Bell's theorem. Dowe shows that Bell's Theorem only rules out a local cause of chance. The locality in Bell's Theorem is based on the fact "that two separate things cannot signal to each other faster than the speed of light" (185). The locality requirement of Bell's Theorem cannot be applied to God because "God is not located in space. Dowe concludes, "If chance exists then either it is caused by God (and that is allowed by Bell's Theorem) and this is no problem for providence and there's no conflict with science; or chance is not caused by God, in which case it's compatible with strong Calvinist providence providing it doesn't lead to meaningful consequences" (189-190).
In this author's opinion, Dowe has some weaknesses and some strengths in this chapter. First, this author will reveal some of the weaknesses. A prominent weakness in this chapter is the fact that Dowe is writing for people of a high level of academic understanding. He is not writing for the common man. This fact makes it difficult for young college and high school students who are interested in theology and theological arguments to follow his discourse and understand what he is trying to reveal to his readers. A weakness of smaller import is that Dowe does not explain in depth what Bell's Theorem is. A weakness of a little more import than the last one is that this author finds Dowe's explanation of determinism lacking in definition. In this author's opinion, Dowe does not tell the reader what he means by determinism. Though what he means can be inferred by reading the entire chapter, most readers will become frustrated by the fact that Dowe does not give a clear definition of what he means by determinism.
The strengths of Dowe's chapter, "God and Chance," are not numerous but are adequate if the reader is well educated and intelligent. A strength of Dowe's chapter is that the information is almost always sequential. Dowe does not jump around and make it difficult to follow if the reader understands the concepts. Dowe cuts straight to the heart of the argument following a straight path. A strength, that seems to contradict what this author said earlier, is that Dowe gives the reader a simplified version of Bell's Theorem. This seems like a contradiction, but this author feels that while Dowe could have given a more in depth explanation of Bell's Theorem he gave an adequate explanation that most readers could follow. Dowe's explanation for locality and how it does not apply to God is a strong point of this chapter. Dowe simply tells the reader what locality is and then why it does not apply to God. The real hidden strength of this chapter is the way that Dowe concludes it. Dowe simply says that Bell's Theorem does not disprove the existence of God and that God and chance can in fact coexist.
