Philip Jahnke
Honors Program
Directed Writing Six
God and Chance
In his chapter God and Chance, Phil Dowe discusses
whether or not God and chance can coexist and "Bell's Theorem for the relation
between divine and natural causation". First, Dowe writes about chance as a
possible worldview and the history of chance as a worldview. Chance as a
worldview has an essential element which is a metaphysical claim. This claim is
"that our universe is intrinsically chaotic in the sense that its development
from moment to moment is sometimes a matter of chance" (170). This means that
the world does not have complete idea of what is going to happen to it next. Dowe
goes on to say that a chance worldview is not new to the world, but that, "the
chance worldview, in our intellectual history, stands in quite stark contrast
to the 'rational worldview,' which has dominated Western thought since the
seventeenth century" (171). This worldview is defended by seventeenth century
philosopher Leibniz believed that God designed the world. Leibniz based his
philosophy on the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The Principle of Sufficient
Reason says, "everything has a reason why it is the way it is rather than some
other way" (171). In the nineteenth century, probability became part of
science. Dowe writes that, "this is not necessarily a blow to determinism,
because probability can be interpreted as a matter of ignorance -- meaning just
that we don't know what the underlying reasons and causes are" (172).
Next, Dowe discusses
providence. He says, "Providence is a theological concept concerned with the
continuing action whereby God preserves and protects the world" (173). Absolute
providence is an idea presented by John Calvin which states that "'Single
events are so regulated by God and all events so proceed from his determinate
counsel, that nothing can happen fortuitously'" (173). Dowe goes on to say that
in absolute deterministic providence there are three claims: God is the
necessary cause of every event and every aspect, God is the sufficient cause of
every aspect and every event, and God provides complete reason.
The next section of this chapter discusses Quantum
Chance. Dowe writes that "'Chance' refers to single-case objective chance"
(178). Dowe goes on to say that determinism, or providence, and chance exclude
each other. This idea is supported by Bell's Theorem. In Bell's theorem there
are no hidden variables and a complete description of the full story is
possible. According to Bell's theorem, determinism is proven false, and there
can now be genuine chance in the world.
In the sections of
the chapter, Dowe goes on to show a loophole in Bell's theorem. Dowe shows that
Bell's Theorem only rules out a local cause of chance. The locality in Bell's
Theorem is based on the fact "that two separate things cannot signal to each
other faster than the speed of light" (185). The locality requirement of Bell's
Theorem cannot be applied to God because "God is not located in space. Dowe
concludes, "If chance exists then either it is caused by God (and that is
allowed by Bell's Theorem) and this is no problem for providence and there's no
conflict with science; or chance is not caused by God, in which case it's
compatible with strong Calvinist providence providing it doesn't lead to meaningful
consequences" (189-190).
In this author's
opinion, Dowe has some weaknesses and some strengths in this chapter. First,
this author will reveal some of the weaknesses. A prominent weakness in this
chapter is the fact that Dowe is writing for people of a high level of academic
understanding. He is not writing for the common man. This fact makes it
difficult for young college and high school students who are interested in
theology and theological arguments to follow his discourse and understand what he
is trying to reveal to his readers. A weakness of smaller import is that Dowe
does not explain in depth what Bell's Theorem is. A weakness of a little more
import than the last one is that this author finds Dowe's explanation of
determinism lacking in definition. In this author's opinion, Dowe does not tell
the reader what he means by determinism. Though what he means can be inferred
by reading the entire chapter, most readers will become frustrated by the fact
that Dowe does not give a clear definition of what he means by determinism.
The strengths of
Dowe's chapter, "God and Chance," are not numerous but are adequate if the
reader is well educated and intelligent. A strength of Dowe's chapter is that
the information is almost always sequential. Dowe does not jump around and make
it difficult to follow if the reader understands the concepts. Dowe cuts
straight to the heart of the argument following a straight path. A strength,
that seems to contradict what this author said earlier, is that Dowe gives the
reader a simplified version of Bell's Theorem. This seems like a contradiction,
but this author feels that while Dowe could have given a more in depth
explanation of Bell's Theorem he gave an adequate explanation that most readers
could follow. Dowe's explanation for locality and how it does not apply to God
is a strong point of this chapter. Dowe simply tells the reader what locality
is and then why it does not apply to God. The real hidden strength of this
chapter is the way that Dowe concludes it. Dowe simply says that Bell's Theorem
does not disprove the existence of God and that God and chance can in fact
coexist.