Kyle Sorkness

This service probably most connects with Honors in that it falls within the realm of aesthetics, which is one of the "ways of knowing" we learned about last semester. As Aristotle might point out, the particular songs sang by the choir connected the congregation to universal truths - in this case, truths from God's Word. In that sense, revelation could be incorporated as a way of knowing that was involved in this experience. And, as long as the ways are being addressed, emotion certainly played some role, as certain songs produced different feelings in the hearts of those who listened. The "aesthetic" experience was made more powerful by the fact that the congregation got to participate and sing along during some of the songs.

I'm not sure that this experience necessarily taught me anything I didn't already know in terms of theology or content. Instead, it articulated those things that I already believe and confess, and it allowed me to participate in the confession and rejoicing that it directed. Because of its aesthetic form, it did present the "material" to me in a new way, which probably caused me to think about some aspects of the faith more or from a different perspective than I normally would.

Thank you, Jubilate Choir, for leading us in this worship service.

The second day began with the mild disappointment that I was the only one who had honored my rule, stated the night before, that no one was allowed to wake up before noon. The day proceeded with some more food over the fire and a rather long hike along the park trails. I needed to get back to Concordia that night for RA duty, so I missed the flooding experience that some of the other Honors students wrote about on their blogs. (I can't say I was too distraught to have missed this particular "bonding experience.")

I could write about the ways in which this trip related to the five ways of knowing, as we discussed around the campfire and as other students are doing on the blogs, but for me, this trip was more about a connection to the environmental focus of Honors this semester. After having read so many different authors on the environment and after having gone quite some time since last leaving the Concordia bubble, it was a breath of fresh air (pun intended) to actually experience nature (whatever "nature" means...).

One of the first things I noticed was the utter quietness of the campsite. When I first got out of the vehicle on Friday night, I was literally surprised by how silent the night seemed. I felt very Thoreauvian as I admired this quietness, the calm of the undisturbed forests, and the overall freshness and greenness of the place. For the first time, I wondered why we hadn't discussed Thoreau and some of our other environmental readings outdoors. It suddenly seemed incredibly ironic to do these readings while stowed away in the upper level of the Library Technology Center at Concordia. Perhaps it would have been harder to argue against or critique the wide-eyed love of the environment expressed by some of these authors if we would have been attempting to do so from the world they were writing about.

Having lived for about half of my childhood on a farm, this time in the "great outdoors" wasn't anything too extremely novel for me, but it was still a meaningful reminder of "what's at stake" in our discussions on the environment. Yes, I realize that this Thoreauvian view of the environment relies heavily on emotion and aesthetics as ways of knowing, but they are ways of knowing nonetheless. By the time this view is combined with environmental science (as we've encountered during our "Science Fridays"), a Christian environmental ethic (as we've encountered during our "Faith Fridays"), and a rational argument, all five ways of knowing have come together to form a rather robust (or complicated?) environmental perspective.

A special thanks to David Edwards for organizing this camping trip.

Dr. Arand began the lecture by saying that the whole realm of environmental ethics can be boiled down to two questions: Who are we? and What is our relationship with the rest of creation? Throughout history, Christians have answered those questions in many different ways. For this lecture, Dr. Arand divided answers to these questions into two categories: those that pitted humans in opposition to nature and those of kinship. Those that created a dualism between humans and the rest of creation were split into three categories: (1) humans above nature, (2) humans over nature, and (3) humans against nature. The "stories of kinship," as he called them, were also divided into three types: (1) humans with nature, (2) humans into nature, and (3) humans within/under nature. Some of these attitudes toward nature were spawned by religious beliefs, some by cultural changes, and some as responses to unsuccessful previous approaches to environmental ethics.

Dr. Arand was one of the members of the Commission on Theology and Church Relations of The Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod that wrote Together with All Creatures: Caring for God's Living Earth. We have been reading this CTCR report this semester in Honors, so Dr. Arand's lecture connected to the Honors classroom in a fundamental way. In fact, as Dr. R. Schuler introduced Dr. Arand last night, she said that the lecture was really just our Honors classroom opened up to the campus and community. As we continue to discuss Christianity's views on creation care and environmental science during our "Faith and Science Fridays," this historical information from Dr. Arand will be helpful. To further the Honors connections, Dr. Arand made references to David Thoreau's Walden, which was a reading for the literature portion of Honors this semester, and to Lynn White's "Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis," an essay we had to respond to for the theology component of Honors. (As a kick-back to last semester, he also referenced Plato's "Allegory of the Cave.")

I suppose that because we've been reading the report he helped write, not too much of what Dr. Arand said during his lecture was new to me. Toward the end, however, especially during the question and answer session, Dr. Arand moved into his understanding of theology and environmentalism. He says that he's been interested lately by thinking about why God created humans in the first place. As I understood him, he's come to the understanding that humans were created to care for the rest of creation. He said that humans were created in God's image so that they could collaborate with Him in that care. The Garden of Eden was Adam and Eve's church; it was where God met them and walked with them. When humans fell into sin, they took the rest of creation down with them. Dr. Arand says that God decided to bring restoration by working the cycle again - beginning with human restoration and then restoring all the rest of creation. As much as I enjoy the history of environmental attitudes, this bit of theology Dr. Arand shared at the end of his lecture probably interested me the most. For that reason, I'm excited to attend his lecture tomorrow, titled, "The Christian and Creation: Dominion and Destruction? Care and Cultivation?"

This semester of Honors is titled "Hearing Their Voices - Globalism, Justice, and the Lives of the Marginalized." I think that all three of these concepts can be seen in this play. The African Americans certainly represent the lives of the marginalized. Especially during the play's point of history, 1862, these people were on the "margins" of society, and their voices were not heard. Slavery was an unjust institution, and the Civil War was, at least in part, an effect of hearing that voice of justice. Finally, globalism, the recognition that nations and people groups are not entirely isolated from each other but are actually part of the same global community, comes to mind as one thinks about, if nothing more, the very term "African American" and what the combining of cultures like that has meant for America and the world.

On a different note, this semester of Honors is focusing on care of the environment. While I'm sure our definitions of "environment" and maybe "creation" will change over the course of the semester (by the way, for those of you who don't know, I tend to be the "definition guy" in Honors), I am currently of the mindset that both of those terms should include fellow human beings. After all, what would our environment be without other people? In "Adrift on the Mississippi," we see the abuse of God's creation as Reverend Hickman is whipped for allegedly acting out of line as a slave. We see the incredible hatred that people can have for each other as this small group of the hated are made to flee for their freedom and respect.

Personally, I've done some thinking about racism lately and have come to realize just how sinful it truly is to judge, hate, or treat people unfairly because of something that can be as "trivial" or "uncontrollable" as the geographical location in which a person's ancestors happened to be born. I am not saying that things like culture and history are not important, but I am saying that 1) skin color does not necessarily tie a person in any meaningful way to another culture or range of experiences. Consider the African Americans in the United States who are many generations removed from anyone who was connected to Africa. Or, consider the fact that I'm largely Norwegian but have really no meaningful connection to that country, culture, language, people, etc. Again, I'm not saying our personal histories aren't important, but as globalism continues to play out and people groups continue to mix in the United States, for example, I think we're all becoming more "American" than anything. So often, our society seems to tell us that that's a bad thing, but I tend to think that the United States, albiet far from perfect, is a pretty amazing place, so I'm fine with dropping the term "Norwegian American" and simply calling myself an American. Besides, isn't it exciting to be a part of a culture that is so diverse and as ever-changing and developing as American culture?

I am also saying that 2) even if a person is more closely tied with another culture or people group, that should not be grounds alone for giving them advantages or disadvantages in society, life, etc. To, for example, give someone a job over someone else for no reason other than racial status seems wrong to me. I think that to judge someone, either positively or negatively, based on something that they cannot control, such as their race, is as unfair as judging someone based on their personal appearance, their family members' actions, etc. For the white men in "Adrift on the Mississippi" to think that the black people "deserved" to be slaves because of their ethnicity is wrong. For a school to not think a student is worthy of admittance because of nothing but his or her race, while it not only admits but might also gives special benefits to those of another race, is wrong.

As we begin to more deeply study the theology behind care of the environment and concern for the marginalized, I look forward to understanding whether these things that I "feel" are sinful truly are according to God's Word. As we learned last semester, we can't trust our emotions as my only guide in life. I have tried to also make use of reason in these thoughts on racism, and now I hope to gain more understanding from revelation. (If you're not aware, last semester was focused on the "ways of knowing.")

As you can see, there is no doubt that this play elicited many thoughts and emotions from me, as I'm sure if did for most people in the audience. As the playwright, Brian A. Grandison, points out, the topics that art like this addresses - things like racism, freedom, slavery, fairness, and treatment of fellow humans - are difficult for us to think about. He says, "We need to tell this story now - right now - because people forget or they start to sand off those uncomfortable moments that make up our history" (Adrift on the Mississippi program). I would agree with Grandison that this is difficult because it means thinking about how we've acted in our human history, but is probably more difficult still because it forces us to think about our "human present" as well.

Thank you, History Theatre and Concordia, for this production. Thank you, aesthetics as a way of knowing, for causing me to see these "universal" issues in a new light through this "particular" expression of them. Thank you, God, for loving us all equally so that You sent Your Son to die the same death for us all, that we might all be made right with You, and so that we might all share that love with each other as equally sinful and equally saved servants and children.

I could write more about the book itself, but I don't want to spoil too much of it. Instead, I'll write about the book discussion we had this morning in class.

Dr. Rhoda Schuler, the lead professor for this semester of the Honors program, began class by presenting us with questions about how Three Cups of Tea related to the poor and marginalized, the environment, and personal inspiration. Our group discussion, an important component of the Honors program, used these questions as a springboard, but quickly turned to more "controversial" issues like the role of religion in the book and in Mortenson's work. I had already begun this conversation a few days ago with another Honors student, so I had some thoughts and questions in mind as we began talking about how Mortenson, raised a Lutheran, interacted with the Islamic faith that surrounded him and his work in Southern Asia.

As I mentioned in class, I found myself thinking back to discussions we had last year in Honors about Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms. While the questions that were raised this morning about Mortenson and religion might not fit perfectly into the scope of that doctrine per se (Honors kids, you know why I couldn't pass up using that Latin here...), I think it came to my mind in so far as it can be related to "secular vs. spiritual." Let me explain.

There is no doubt that Greg Mortenson's work is inspiring for me. I value education very much, and I feel a calling to serve the poor and marginalized. In response to Dr. Schuler's question about whether the book inspired me to be an advocate of such things, I wrote, "It inspired me, of course. He was not privileged in any way to do this kind of work - he didn't possess all the right skills or hold the best positions - but he went for it anyway, wasn't afraid to fail sometimes, learned along the way, and was wildly successful in the end."

At the same time, as much as I am inspired and encouraged by Mortenson's work, as a Christian, I have some concerns and questions about the role of religion. As Dr. Schuler noted this morning, we as Christians believe, teach, and confess that Jesus Christ is the way, the truth, and the life, and that no one comes to the Father except through him (John 14:6). That is a claim of exclusivity. That means we hold that there is one true faith.

What does this mean? Good question (it usually is at a Lutheran university). Well, for one, it means that "political correctness" can be difficult. As Carrie pointed out in class this morning, it becomes necessary to distinguish between respect and acceptance. She said that she thinks we should respect all people as being individuals who have the right to freedom of religion, while that respect does not equate to accepting their faith system as true. Honors students held somewhat differing views on this area of discussion, but many seemed to agree that whatever Mortenson did/is doing is walking a fairly blurry line. The ways in which he embraced Islam - praying as they did, asking Allah for blessings, etc. - have probably sent mixed messages to readers of Three Cups of Tea. Did he convert to Islam? Is he still Christian? Does he know what he believes? Does he care? As a couple other students, like Jackie, also pointed out, the way he related to the religion of the people around him overseas sometimes raised questions about his understandings of religion. Sometimes it was as though he had a very utilitarian view of faith systems and might have used an interest and acceptance of Islam as "leverage," as Jackie put it.

Again, there is no doubt in my mind that we should serve and love all people, regardless of their religion, race, or any other characteristic. There is also no doubt in my mind that what Mortenson is doing by building schools is a good thing for the world. My questions arise, though, when I start to wonder what we mean by "good for the world." There seem to be secular goods, like food, clothing, shelter, education, health, and so on, and there seems to be a spiritual good: forgiveness and salvation by grace through faith in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ on your behalf. Can I as a Christian be concerned with or work toward one and not the other, or are they inseparable? Can one compromise the other? Does one need to come first?

For now, it's probably fitting to end with those questions, since I honestly don't have the answers. I'd be happy to hear your thoughts, so I encourage you to leave a comment.

(Here's to an enlightening final semester of Honors!)

[Disclaimer: This Directed Writing was to be written on-the-spot, in-class, so it's certainly not a polished work.]

After having viewed 18 other presentations of how the "five ways of knowing" work in people's personal lives, my own understanding on the topic has further developed. Three of those ways in which my thoughts on the matter changed lie in my definition of science as a way of knowing, my understanding of the role of reason, and the distinction I noticed between gathering and analyzing information.

One way in which my understanding of the five ways of knowing has developed is in the amendment of my definition of science. Throughout the HON110 course, science as a way of knowing has been closely related to the scientific method. Depending on one's definition of "scientific method," one is either referencing a very formal, structured, and universal process by which science is conducted or is referencing a less formal general pattern of the way in which humans sometimes gather knowledge in which some hypothesis is made and then "tested." Many, if not most, of the students said in their presentations that science is their least favorite and least utilized way of knowing. I think this is due to a stricter definition of "scientific method" that causes people to associate science solely with a controlled laboratory environment and formal procedures. Those students who said that science does play a role in their everyday lives often made use of the looser definition of the scientific method. One or two students even ventured to define science as a way of knowing apart from the scientific method, basing its identity on only some components of the method such as observation or testing. This definition, however, seems to rob science of its uniqueness. Is not observation a component of using aesthetics as a way of knowing? Does not one have to make use of "testing" when gaining knowledge through reason? To help science maintain its identity as a way of knowing, I have, based on the ways in which these presentations compelled me, amended my own definition of the term. The amendment comes in adding the stipulation that science must include repeatable testing on a physical object (I believe that Chris Anderson's presentation, among others, helped me add this requirement of physicality). Since the observations associated with aesthetics do not lead to repeatable testing (it is true that some piece of aesthetics can be "tested" by various interpretations many times, but these "tests" are not repeatable in the sense that the methods used and variables involved cannot be universally regulated between individuals - every individual's interpretation will follow a different method and will make use of unique variables such as past life experiences), this amended definition maintains the identity of science from confusion with aesthetics. The methods and variables involved in testing a hypothesis within reason can be (and arguably must be for the sake of the discipline) universal, but reason is not confined to analyzing the physical, so this amendment also preserves science's identity from reason's reach. (Theoretical science, by my definition, then, is more closely related to reason than proper science.) It should be noted that because I hold to some combination of the overlapping and interpenetrating magisteria models, it is not wrong for these ways of knowing to intersect, but at their cores, their definitions must make them unique enough to exist as separate entities.

Another way in which my understanding of the five ways of knowing has developed as a result of these class presentations is seen in the extension of the role of reason. Almost all of the students said something about reason being involved in all of the other ways of knowing. This brought me to believe that reason's function is not only present, but actually necessary in all of the other ways of knowing (consider Anna Shaw's presentation, among many others). In the realm of science, it is fairly easy to spot the work of reason, but even in the less "mathematical" ways of knowing, i.e., emotion, revelation, and aesthetics, reason is required for what is known to "make sense." When something is known through revelation, there is an inherent process of interpretation that has lead to that knowledge. That interpretation cannot happen without some degree of reason. For example, a person would probably check the information revealed to them against other knowledge that they have either from revelation or the other ways of knowing (Joanna Johnson's presentation helped clarify this point for me). That "checking" requires the use of reason. In a similar way, gaining knowledge through aesthetics requires one to connect to universal truths through particular representations of those truths. Again, that "connection" follows either inductive or deductive reasoning. Finally, even emotions, perhaps the way of knowing with the greatest potential of being "unreasonable," involves a person coming to an emotion as a result of reasoning through some experience or other knowledge. This reasoning often takes place on the subconscious level, so reason's role is not always obvious.

Along similar lines, my understanding also developed in how I believe the ways of knowing relate to gathering versus analyzing information. Comments from students about the "universal" and basically unavoidable presence of reason and emotion helped me to see that they serve more as filters for analyzing information gained through other ways of knowing than they serve as ways of collecting raw information. Descartes spoke of reason as though it could produce knowledge entirely on its own without the influence of any other way of knowing, but many students said that they did not agree with this claim. I would argue now that emotion also cannot "produce" raw information in the way that revelation or science, for example, can. Many students represented in their photo montages this idea that emotion is a filter present in all other ways of knowing through the use of a string-like object that moved throughout all of the other ways. Science has the ability to gather raw data (to be filtered and analyzed by itself and the other ways of knowing) through observation and repeatable testing of physical objects. Aesthetics can provide raw data in the sense that some new aesthetic piece must be presented to an individual before he or she can begin to work with this new information and gain knowledge. Revelation is perhaps the clearest example of gaining new information that is beyond oneself (whereas reason and emotion as filters come more so from "within oneself") in that the authority for revelation is precisely that - a source, like God, that is outside the realm of one's own mind and provides new information to the individual. Of course, these "information gatherers" can also act as filters (many students spoke about filtering everything they encounter through revelation, for example), my point is that, at their core, reason and emotion can be separated as having more to do with filtering from the ways of knowing that have the ability to gather raw information. This is largely due to the fact that the information-gathering ways of knowing make use of a person's five senses, while reason and emotion can take place apart from any sensory requirements.

This experience of class presentations has demonstrated to me the importance of intellectual discussion and the sharing of ideas. As has been shown here, my understanding of the five ways of knowing was amended, extended, and otherwise elaborated as a result of these presentations. It is my hope that continuing to consider the thoughts of others (especially those thoughts that differ from my own) will continue to help my understanding in all areas of life find growth.

[Disclaimer: This writing is not as "finished" as I would like it to be.]

terrorism - Terrorism is "a form of politically motivated action combining psychological (fear inducing) and physical (violent action) components carried out by individuals or small groups with the aim of inducing communities or states to meet the terrorists' demands" ("terrorism").

pre-emptive war - Pre-emptive war is war that is "waged in an attempt to repel or defeat an imminent offensive or invasion, or to gain a strategic advantage in an impending (usually unavoidable) war" ("Pre-emptive war").

wrong - Something is wrong if it is "not in accordance with a code, convention or set of rules" ("wrong"). That code is often morally or ethically-based.

Major Writing Assignment

When answering questions about the legitimacy of war, many people turn to the branch of philosophy known as just war theory. While there are various ways of organizing the components of just war theory, one could say (as does William V. O'Brien) that there are three main criteria that must be met for a war to be considered just: the war must be declared by "a competent authority for a public purpose," just cause must exist, and there must be a "right intention that aims at peace" (qtd. in White 419). The first and third criteria are certainly not free from debate or interpretation, but arguments on the justification of wars usually rise or fall on the second criterion. Just cause has some "formal" components within just war theory, but arguments made for just cause often fit no mold and are based on many different perspectives. This essay will step outside of a rigid just war theory structure to explore three ways in which pre-emptive war can satisfy just cause. Even in an age of terrorism, pre-emptive war is not always wrong because an imminent enemy attack is known, those planning the imminent attack have forfeited their right to life, and the total destruction can sometimes be minimized.

First, pre-emptive war is not always wrong because, by definition, the enemy attack is known to be imminent. Pre-emptive war is often confused with the concept of preventive war, in which there is only a potential for an enemy attack. For this reason, preventive war is often seen as a matter of aggression, while pre-emptive war is seen as an act of self-defense. It seems wrong to use aggression to justify an action as strong as war, while self-defense seems like a "nobler" justification. [1] Secondly, when the enemy attack is known to be imminent, pre-emptive war is justified because it is as if the war has already begun. By having definitively planned an attack, the enemy nation has declared war. In this sense, the pre-emptive act is not preceding war, but only the first destructive act. Before either of these points can be made, it must be understood that it is indeed possible to truly know that an enemy is going to attack. One shortcoming of traditional just war theory (or even less-formal arguments about the justification for war) is a focus on the factual conditions of the given situation to the exclusion of the epistemological conditions. Arguments on justification of war need to consider not only "what is the case and what is not the case," but also "what can be known, is reasonable to believe, and so on" (Dipert 36). For preemptive war to be justified, the "epistemic threshold" must be met, meaning that there can and must be "'objective certainty' about the enemy's intentions, bellicosity, and present and future military resources," not "merely a subjective certainty in feeling strongly about the extent of evidence for these factors" (Dipert 43). It should be conceded that situations in which this threshold is met are generally thought to be rare; however, the rarity of such situations is thought to be decreasing thanks to new technologies that have arguably increased the potential for certain knowledge of an attack. "In some cases, we will today be justified in believing that a nation will attack us in the future with greater epistemic justification than nations of the past had to believe that they had already been attacked," largely because of these advancements in technology (Dipert 41). While imminency of attack is a necessary condition for pre-emptive war to be justified, it must be shown why such an attack is worth impeding.

Using pre-emptive war in response to knowledge of an imminent attack is not always wrong because the right to life must be protected and the enemies planning the attack have forfeited their right to life by planning to steal that right from their target. To accept this argument, it must be first understood that the right to life is popularly thought to be given by God to every individual. Christians might look to the creation account in Genesis, in which God breathes life into humans (Genesis 2:7) or to the fifth commandment, "you shall not murder," (Exodus 20:13) in which they can see the inference that there is something about an individual's life that makes taking it away wrong. [2] Even non-biblical sources speak of the right to life as being God-given. The United States Declaration of Independence, for example, states that "all Men are created equal" and are "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness [emphasis added]" ("Declaration of Independence"). For those who do not believe in a higher being who has granted this right, the preceding arguments do not hold much weight, but even these people still attach high value to the right to life and have developed irreligious systems for determining that depriving someone of this value is wrong and must be responded to. A popular example of such a system is retributive justice, as outlined by Immanuel Kant. Kant's work in philosophy centered on the concept of the categorical imperative, which says that a given action is right if the person acting would will all other persons to act by the same maxim. In terms of justice, this means that someone who is guilty of a crime must be punished appropriately. To not punish the guilty by applying their maxim to them would be to pervert the entire enterprise of justice and would undermine equality, Kant says, and "if justice and righteousness perish, human life would no longer have any value in the world" (qtd. in White 210). [3] Writing specifically on the issue of capital punishment, Kant says a person who kills another should be seen as also killing himself, as this maxim of committing murder must now be applied to him for justice to be upheld (qtd. in White 211). According to Kant's system, the death caused by pre-emptive war is justified because for justice to prevail, the maxim that life can be stolen, which has been adopted by the enemy nation, must be applied to that enemy nation. Terrorism, by its very nature, serves as a strong example of this forfeiture of right to life. On one hand, terrorism often includes the ending of others' lives. On the other hand, terrorists are often willing to forfeit their own right to life for their mission or cause. To use a recent historical example, those who saw the World Trade Center towers fall and were then bombarded with images and stories of terrorists and their motives, "knew" that these people were evil and that they were completely willing to disrespect their own right to life for the evil purpose of ending the lives of others. [4]

Thirdly, as it has been established that the basis for the evil of war is the destruction of the right to life, it can be said that any measure that would lessen the amount of destruction of life would be justified, so pre-emptive war is not always wrong because it can sometimes accomplish this objective. In this age of terrorism and advanced technology, nuclear weapons are a popular exemplification of just how utterly destructive war can be. Nuclear weapons are more destructive than any form of war weapon previously known because, rather than relying on a projectile or a "simple" explosion, they utilize the fission of radioactive materials. Aside from the devastating explosion, incredible destruction is caused by the radiation, electromagnetic and particulate, that occurs during and after the nuclear blast ("Nuclear Explosions"). The wide-spread damage to human life and health occurs in the form of blast injuries, burns, and radiation injuries ("Nuclear Explosions"). [5] For pre-emptive war to be justified, not only must a nation in question possess weapons of mass destruction, but there must also be certain knowledge that these weapons will be used to attack and rob others of their right to life. So, if the destruction to life caused by an imminent attack, which could be almost incomprehensible when nuclear weapons are considered, could be lessened by a pre-emptive attack, pre-emptive war is justified. There also exists a more formal principle which attests to this argument, commonly called the "urgency principle." In his influential book Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Welzer distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate pre-emptive strikes with the requirement of what he calls "sufficient threat," a "necessarily vague phrase" that includes three components, one of which is "a general situation in which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk" (Walzer 81). Therefore, by the urgency principle, pre-emptive war is justified because acting preemptively can lessen the total destruction to life. Finally, historical examples show that the amount of total destruction can be minimized by a pre-emptive attack in some situations. Many people consider the Cuban Missile Crisis to be one such example, holding that the United States' pre-emptive action taken toward Cuba in the form of a blockade and other means generally regarded as acts of war prevented the much greater destruction that would have been caused had the Cubans launched the missiles on the U.S (Dipert 42). [6] Other popular historical examples where destruction was lessened by anticipatory actions include the 1981 bombing of Iraq by Israel to destroy a nuclear reactor and the War of the Spanish Succession (Dipert 42). Of course, it is often difficult to use these examples as "proof" that anticipatory action is justified in some situations because of the very nature of historical accounts and the way in which "the facts" are interpreted differently by various groups of people for political, religious, or other reasons. [7] [8]

As has been shown, pre-emptive war, even in an age of terrorism, is not always wrong because the enemy's attack is imminent and known, the right to life of the enemy has been forfeited by their intention to steal that right from others, and pre-emptive war can minimize the total destruction of a war situation. The justification of pre-emptive war is difficult in that it often stretches the boundaries of traditional just war theory, and just cause is satisfied for many and various reasons. It has been shown here that pre-emptive war is not always wrong because the war has already begun when a nation knows of an imminent enemy attack. Pre-emptive war is also not wrong both because the right to human life must be protected and because the attacking nation has forfeited its right to life categorically, a forfeit that is so clearly seen in the case of terrorism. Finally, the potential of minimizing the total destruction of war by an anticipatory action further shows that even in an age of terrorism, pre-emptive war is not always wrong.

[1] This argument uses emotion as a way of knowing. People "feel" that self-defense is more innocent than aggression, which is an emotion that often carries negative connotations.

[2] These arguments rely on revelation as a way of knowing truth.

[3] One can see how Kant knows that there is value to human life apart from anything shown to him through revelation. He instead uses reason, largely through definition of terms, rhetoric, and deduction, and sometimes even an appeal to "common sense," to come to this understanding (and the entire understanding of retributive justice, for that matter).

[4] This uses aesthetics as a way of knowing. In his Poetics, Aristotle explains that "the arts" communicate universal concepts through particular means (Aristotle). In this case, the universal concepts of fear, grief, and even revenge were conveyed through the actual sight of the 9/11 attacks and the news coverage and pieces of are that were created in response.

[5] This information about the destructive abilities of nuclear weapons is known through science. Obviously, these weapons are a result of scientific work, but their effects have also been hypothesized and tested throughout history (sometimes at great costs), so the scientific method has been at work not only in their creation, but also in their testing.

[6] In this example, it was not "known" that Cuba was planning to launch these missiles on the U.S., so the criteria of a certain imminent attack was not met. So, if this "preventive" move from the U.S. was justified, then the condition that the total amount of destruction can be minimized by a pre-emptive/preventive strike is strong enough by itself in some situations to justify the pre-emptive/preventive actions.

[7] But, if enough people seem to agree that one of these historical examples shows justification for pre-emptive action, consensus gentium could be claimed as a way of knowing that this is true (Hillmer).

[8] These historical examples use science as a way of knowing because the scientific method can be seen in this argument on a macro level. A hypothesis was made that the amount of total destruction could be minimized by a pre-emptive attack in some situations. The hypothesis was then "tested" in these historical examples. After the results of the experiments were gathered, meaning in these cases that the total amount of damage was assessed and compared to the predicted damage of the imminent enemy attack, a conclusion was drawn. Just as scientific theories continued to be honed and revised by the scientific method and repeated experiments, a concept known as defeasibility (Dowe 193), this hypothesis continues to be tried by historical situations, some of which seem to prove and some disprove it.

Works Cited

Aristotle. Poetics. Trans. S. H. Butcher. Malcolm Heath, 1998. Web. 8 Dec. 2010.

"Declaration of Independence." 1776. Print.

Dipert, Randall R. "Preventive War and the Epistemological Dimension of the Morality of War." Journal of Military Ethics 5.1 (2006) : 32-54. Print.

Dowe, Phil. Galileo, Darwin, and Hawking. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2005. Print.

Hillmer, Paul. Ways of Knowing: How to think like an Honors Student. Concordia University. St. Paul, MN. 13 Sep. 2010. Lecture.

"Nuclear Explosions: Weapons, Improvised Nuclear Devices." Radiation Emergency Medical Management. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, n.d. Web. 8 Dec. 2010.

"Pre-emptive war - Definition." wordiQ.com. n.p., n.d. Web. 8 Dec. 2010.

"terrorism." Collins Dictionary of Sociology. London: Collins, 2006. Credo Reference. Web. 08 December 2010.

Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars. New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1977. Print.

White, James E., ed. Contemporary Moral Problems. 6th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 2000. Print.

"wrong." The Macquarie Dictionary. South Yarra: The Macquarie Library Pty Ltd., 2005. Credo Reference. Web. 08 December 2010.

On April 16, 1963, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was detained at a jail in Birmingham, Alabama while he wrote his now-famous open letter to fellow religious leaders, aptly titled, Letter from a Birmingham Jail. In the letter, King writes about a few components of the African American Civil Rights Movement. To the clergymen, King writes especially about religion as it relates to civil rights and the movement, civil disobedience, and militant nonviolence. As will be shown here, although King combines these concepts and applies them to a unique situation, he is not the first person to write on these issues, and those people who have come before him have both supported and opposed his positions.

The first of King's arguments relating religion and civil rights is that freedom is one of humanity's "God given rights" (2). The second argument follows, saying that, therefore, to take away that God-given right to freedom is "morally wrong and sinful" (King 3). A combination of these arguments and some assumptions about the role of the Christian church leads into his next point, which is that the Christian church is the steward of and has obligations toward what King refers to as the "gospel of freedom" (1). This gospel has less to do with eternal salvation and is more concerned with protecting that social freedom from God in this life.

King was not the first to argue that such freedom is a right from God. In fact, in the letter, he appeals to the notion that the United States is built on such ideologies. Looking at the Declaration of Independence, drafted largely by Thomas Jefferson, one can see language similar to King's. Of course, the most popular line of the Declaration aligns with King's philosophy regarding equality, rights, and religion very closely: "We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness" ("Declaration of Independence" 1). Later, the Declaration reads that it is actually the right and duty of a people to throw off oppressive rulers as a way to uphold these rights ("Declaration of Independence" 1).

Civil disobedience is another topic King writes about in this open letter to the clergymen. He discusses the moral responsibilities people have to "obey just laws" and "disobey unjust laws" as well as the morality of the laws themselves, and he gives examples of famous historical events, which he calls instances of successful civil obedience. Throughout the letter, King exalts the values of fairness, the individual, reason, and representation in government.

In many ways, one could compare King's thoughts on civil disobedience with one of the central messages of the Enlightenment, that being that one can use reason as an authority for truth, even against disagreeing established institutions or governments. In An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? Immanuel Kant calls for people to be courageous and make use of their reason rather than submitting to an oppressive and restrictive ruler. Kant says that freedom is a prerequisite, even a certain cause, for enlightenment (1). Just as King argued that unjust (racist) laws should not be obeyed, Kant says that obstacles to freedom must be removed for enlightenment and that people must resist the pressure to think as they are told to think and do as they are told to do when these commands so clearly conflict with reason and basic rights.

Finally, King also states his positions on militant nonviolence. He says that the practice is an unfortunate necessity, defines its basic steps, argues that its goal is to create constructive tension, and explains that the means of militant nonviolence "must be as pure as the ends [sought]" (King 8). Again, since his letter is addressed to spiritual leaders, King includes a religiously based rationale and examples for his arguments for militant nonviolence and its effectiveness.

Whereas the two previously cited pieces of literature somewhat paralleled King's message, Jean Jacques Rousseau and his Social Contract seem to be in disagreement with Dr. King. Rousseau says that Christians are solely concerned with heavenly things and therefore have little care about the state of affairs on this earth. Unlike Kant, Jefferson, and King, who all advocate taking action against oppression, Rousseau says that Christians would not take action, because doing so would probably require violence, and even if that was not the case, he says that since Christians have their minds in the heavens, they should not really care whether they are oppressed or not (4). Rousseau goes so far as to say that "true Christians are made to be slaves, and they know it and do not much mind: this short life counts for too little in their eyes" (4). Although King agrees that violent action is not the solution, he most certainly disagrees that Christians should not be concerned with people's earthly lives, and it is obvious from King's work and message that he gives no thought to the idea that Christians should be content with slavery to unjust systems.

The African American Civil Rights Movement was fueled by ideas about equality, freedom, rights, civil disobedience, and nonviolent demonstrations. Religious ideas also played a large role, and in Martin Luther King, Jr.'s letter to fellow clergymen, one can see how this key figure saw the role of spirituality, specifically Christianity, in the movement. King's concepts can be compared and contrasted with predecessors like Jefferson and Kant, who offer up arguments for freedom, rational thought, and fighting against oppression, and with predecessors like Rousseau, who holds quite a different view on the relationship between Christians and social activism. It is this constant reframing and reassessing of previous ideas and assumptions that gives force to movements like this and drives societies to continue to reshape the world within and around them.

Works Cited

King, Martin Luther, Jr. Letter from a Birmingham Jail. 1963. Print.

Kant, Immanuel. An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? 1784. Print.

Rousseau, Jean Jacques. The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right. 1762. Print.

Declaration of Independence. 1776. Print.

Faith and reason are two terms which seem to be inherently opposed to each other. For reason is the tool humans use, along with the five sense, to gain understanding, while "faith is being sure of what we hope for and certain of what we do not see" (Hebrews 11:1). Reason is often attached to the ways of this world, while faith is thought to be beyond explanation in one's earthly existence. Reason is the distraction of heathen philosophers, while faith is developed through ancient, unquestionable, sacred texts. It was the daunting mission of St. Thomas Aquinas to reconcile these two apparent enemies. To attempt to do so using only either reason or faith would seem to be counterproductive, so Aquinas makes use of both. Because of this, many philosophers may be skeptical of his logic, while theologians may be made uncomfortable by the weight he gives to human reason. Nevertheless, his writings have had an incredible impact on an untold number of people and have immeasurably affected entire schools of thought, especially in the Catholic church, but even in the Western world as a whole.

Although it is Aquinas' goal to allow faith and reason to coexist in the Christian's system of knowing, he is quick and sure to draw distinctions between the two. Aquinas refers to reason as "natural" in the sense that it is instilled in all humans. It is related to this world, the things in it, the senses given to humans to experience this world, and their ability to process and think critically about those sensations. In contrast, faith is a thing of the supernatural order. In that way, faith is related to God, angels, and divine wisdom. Faith is not able to be perceived by human senses or understood completely by human reason. So his argument is not that reason and faith are one and the same, but that because they were created as different entities, they serve unique purposes and can coexist in a good and Godly way.

Aquinas makes use, even if not directly by name, of the three primary truths. The first fact is the fact of human existence. The first condition is that the mind has the ability to know the truth. Finally, the first principle is that of non-contradiction, that is, a statement cannot be both true and false. Aquinas' argument regarding the harmony between faith and reason in Chapter VII of his Summa Contra Gentiles can be examined through a look at his use of these three primary truths.

It is obvious that Aquinas holds that both humans and God exist. Humans exist as part of God's creation. God exists as "divine Wisdom Himself" (Aquinas 332). Aquinas differentiates between different levels of existence as being cable of different levels of natural knowledge (reason). Humans, for example, are not capable of understanding as much as an angel through natural knowledge. Angels, likewise, are not capable of understanding as much as God Himself.

Aquinas reaches some interesting dilemmas in regards to the first condition. While he argues that reason is capable of understanding some things, he also makes it clear that "certain divine truths wholly surpass the capability of human reason" (Aquinas 328). So, a definition of "the mind" would be useful for talking about the first condition, but since Aquinas does not provide such a definition in this excerpt, one must assume he would argue that the mind (if understood as a thing of reason) is not capable of knowing all truth, but that the "soul itself" is the vehicle through which "the human intellect mounts to the knowledge of God" (Aquinas 329).

It is in discussing the first principle, the principle of non-contradiction, that Aquinas places most of his weight in his argument for harmony between faith and reason. Using what some might see as rather shaky logic, Aquinas deduces that those things which are known by natural knowledge are so obviously true that they cannot be false. At the same time, those things which are known by faith also cannot be false because faith is a product of God. Since God both instilled natural knowledge in humans and gives faith, and since God cannot provide both true and false knowledge as a result of the principle of non-contradiction (God being the divine Wisdom that He is), then it is impossible for natural knowledge and faith to be opposed to each other. From this line of arguments, Aquinas concludes that "whatever arguments are alleged against the teachings of faith, they do not rightly proceed from the first self-evident principles instilled by nature," which means that they are flawed arguments and "it is possible to solve them" (Aquinas 334).

While Aquinas' cause is valiant, his undertaking seems to be one of potential paradox. After all, one might ask exactly how Aquinas came to this understanding of understanding. Did he reason through everything or receive some kind of divine revelation? It appears that he incorporated some of each, which may work well for those who are already willing to look to each as a credible way of knowing, but it seems somewhat unlikely that he will win over any atheist philosophers or reason-skeptical Christians. Some Christians might also be confused about Aquinas' almost completely positive outlook on natural knowledge, perhaps wondering where he left room for the effects of original sin in affecting "the natural." Nevertheless, Aquinas' writings still stand today as a successful marriage of the pagan Aristotle and the Christian scriptures at the most, and at the least, a fascinating fling between the flirting couple of reason and faith.

[The following Directed Writing assignment was written on-the-spot, in-class, so it's probably a little rougher than some of the other writings here.]

Throughout the past few weeks in the Honors program, I have been made to think more seriously about the philosophy of art than ever before. Dr. Schenk and Dr. Mahnke presented the study of art in such a way that it focused on the magisterium of aesthetics rather than simply discussing specific forms of media or even specific movements within art (although there was some degree of these things as well). My understanding of art has progressed from viewing it mostly in some vague sense as an enjoyable form of emotional expression to seeing it as a vehicle for sharing ideas in a way none of the other "ways of knowing" can. So, at the most basic level, I would say that the arts are important because they supply a unique way of knowing.

As someone who thrives off of definitions, I feel like it is necessary to define this term "ways of knowing." As the subtitle for this year of Honors that is only weeks underway, it is difficult to understand the phrase in its fullest sense. At the least, I can say that we are being presented with five ways of knowing: aesthetics, emotion, reason, revelation, and science. From what one may know (or think they know) about these "magisteria," it might be apparent how aesthetics is able to work with the other magisteria, and yet provide unique ways of conveying thoughts.

One way to demonstrate this is to contrast aesthetics with reason. When I think of reason, I think of a pairing of language and logic. As much as I adore these two giants, there seem to be some things, not limited to but certainly including emotion, that cannot be communicated or studied very well through their use. A pairing of language with some sort of emotional logic-substitute, think poetry, would be better suited for conveying such thoughts that are "beyond reason." But even still, our beloved languages have their limits. Sometimes, one must make use of paint and a canvas, musical notes, or stones, chisels, and building materials to convey a message that cannot otherwise be shared from person to person through speech or writing. Plato was skeptical about the arts because of this fact that they are only "imitations" of actual things and because they are not based on reason, but this is the very "reason" why I believe the arts are their own unique way of knowing.

Graham says that art is not so much a way of understanding because it does not guide our minds from one concretely expressed truth to another, but he did think that it could "supply the imaginative apprehension of experience." It seems to me like his definition of "way of understanding/knowing" is limited to more logic-based methods, but in my current definition, his claim that the arts can supply "apprehension" would constitute them as a way of knowing. With this broader definition of the concept of ways of knowing, it seems that all of life becomes a candidate for inclusion in the "ways" and that the study of these semesters is focused on considering all aspects of live, analyzing them, and then grouping them together into five categories so that we can better understand how the five work independently as well as integrated with each other.

As I have already stated a couple times above, my definition of "ways of knowing" has much to do with communicating thoughts from person to person. Aristotle assists me in this broader definition, I think, by claiming that the arts work in universals for this very purpose. Our in-class discussions with Drs. Schenk and Mahnke helped explain this use of universals by teaching us that the arts begin with individuals, then move to universals. The person "receiving" the art then applies those universal truths to him or herself. As Drs. Schenk and Mahnke said, "The goal of our journey [through the arts] is to find home." This might mean furthering one's understanding of him or herself, but it could also apply to one's understanding of things outside him or herself, namely other individuals and, really, the rest of all that a person is capable of having thoughts about - the physical world, the spiritual, etc. Therefore, it is through this individual-to-universal-to-individual method of communicating thoughts that I believe the aesthetic magisterium helps us know, believe, and understand ourselves, each other, and God's creation.

In summary, I believe that the arts, or "aesthetics," to use the broader term, are important because they supply us with a unique way of knowing. I have used the teachings of Aristotle, Graham, and Schenk and Mahnke to explain how I believe the arts do this. I broadened my understanding of "ways of knowing" and argued that the arts are one of the ways because of their ability to communicate thoughts in ways the other "magisteria" cannot - ways that are beyond the limitations of language, logic, and reason, ways that utilize "imitation" to connect individuals to individuals by means of universal truths.

Works Cited

Crouch, Andy. "What Exactly is Postmodernism?" Christianity Today. Christianity Today International, 13 Nov. 2000. Web. 24 Sept. 2010.

"Metanarrative." The Macquarie Dictionary. South Yarra: The Macquarie Library Pty Ltd. Credo Reference. Web. 25 Sept. 2010.