September 2010 Archives

I'm too Lutheran to be Postmodern.

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The following blog is a consideration and discussion of the sentence "this sentence serves no logical purpose" in view of postmodernism.  Enjoy :)

          Before attempting to jump into a discussion of this sentence I want to first try and wrap my mind around some of the major points of postmodernism. From what we discussed in class I think postmodernism is, at its roots, a response. Where modernism said Science was absolute truth, postmodernism responded by saying no such thing existed.  In response to clear boundaries, especially in the arts, lines were blurred and genres were crossed.  A strong sense of individualism was replaced with conflicting identities.  Following an age that valued consumerism and tended to ignore the less fortunate this worldview developed with the marginalized and a "healthy" skepticism of truth in mind.  I say "healthy" because I believe the initial mistrust of truth was caused by our strong belief in the supremacy of scientific advancement and our overwhelming consumer capitalism.  In that sense I agree that it is indeed healthy to examine the choices that say we should destroy our environment for the sake of "progress" or ignore the poor for the sake of our wealth rather than blindly accepting them.  However, I think that is about the point where I stop agreeing with postmodernism.  From what I understand the postmodernist distrust of truth stretches much further.  One example of this is "The Postmodern idea that religious beliefs are private preferences ... because no one religion can be true" (Noebel 81).  As a Christian I strongly disagree with this idea.  I also tend to disagree with their overall distrust of metanarratives.  While I do agree that it is important to examine the world's truths I think it is wrong to say there are no universal truths or ideas.  One example of this, an example that will actually provide a nice segue into a discussion of the sentence if you bear with me, is the statement "God so loved the world."  For a postmodernist this statement does not work; first because they don't believe in the existence of God and second because it creates a metanarrative for the whole world.  The ironic thing is that by saying there are no metanarratives postmodernists are in fact creating a metanarrative (Noebel 120).

            This is where the sentence comes in.  I believe it is another example of the somewhat ironic and seemingly apparent double standard of postmodernism.  I have a feeling Foucault or Derrida could look at that sentence and provide an eloquent explanation of why they agree with it.  When I look at it, on the other hand, I see a logical statement that is trying to make a point about the illogicalness of language.  To me it exists as a contradiction in the same way that claiming there are no metanarratives creates a contradictory metanarrative. 

            Along those same lines postmodernists also possess great skepticism about language.  Jacques Derrida, a postmodern French philosopher, strongly believed in the concept of deconstruction.  This literary methodology criticizes texts by claiming it is impossible for the reader to interpret them without applying their own biases, assumptions, and prejudices (Noebel 120).   Therefore the words and language we use can never actually describe the "true" world because they are merely a representation of the biased words we've been conditioned to use.  This is another reason why the given sentence is a good representation of postmodernism.  The sentence would serve no logical purpose because the words used to create it are subject to the interpretation of each individual who reads it.  Each individual would apply their own truth and knowledge to the sentence, rendering it incapable of possessing one true, logical purpose.  A classic example of this is Belgian Rene Magritte's painting The Treachery of Images.  In this painting the words "This is not a pipe" are written below a painting of a pipe.  Magritte's goal was to show that images are merely representations of objects, not actual objects themselves.  In the same way that the pipe is not a true pipe the sentence is not a true statement. 

this-is-not-a-pipe.jpg

            While I disagree with most of the main points of postmodernism, I feel as though I'm approaching the topic with a negative attitude (which, unfortunately, plays right into Derrida's point).  There are key fundamental differences between this view and my Christian view that make it hard for me to approach the topic with an open mind.  But in the spirit of not disagreeing with postmodernism from a postmodern standpoint I can say that I see contradictions within their beliefs and for that reason choose not to agree with them.  Postmodernism isn't all bad, however.  As Andy Glenn Stanton writes in a Christianity Today article, "The death of modernism has us listening anew to a rumor of angels... and rediscovering the supernatural.  It finds us seeking something more.  That is the postmodern turn.  It doesn't promise good things for the church, but it does provide a massive opportunity, if only we will seize it" (1).  If anything this postmodern trend is an opportunity for us as the church to step up and share the good news we've been given.  We might have to find new ways to explain that God loves the world, but I think we're up to the challenge.  


            After reading the selections from Collingwood and Jerome, it seems as though a large portion of the challenges historians face originate from human methods of thought.  The authors each discuss different problems, but both can find their roots in human information processing methods.  While Collingwood chooses to focus on the thought processes of the historian conducting the research, Jerome focuses on the thoughts of those creating what may someday become research.  However, in both cases and from both perspectives the difficulties that arise originate in human thought.

            From the onset of his writing it is clear Jerome is skeptical of the human record of the past.  In addition to citing several examples of falsified stories that became history he also quotes Froude as having said, "History [is] like a child's box of letters, with which we can spell any word we please.  We have only to pick out such letters as we want, arrange them as we like, and say nothing about those which do not suit our purpose" (183).  He explains, however, that his reservations do not stem from the belief that all history is deliberately falsified.  Instead he refers to several studies that demonstrate the ways in which the human mind unconsciously falsifies information, even after a short amount of time.  One study which involved recalling details from several black and white photographs produced only seventeen correct responses out of 282 depositions (186).  Those involved not only wanted to tell the truth but believed they were.  Jerome argues that if "good faith, the desire to tell the truth, ... the certainty that the testimony is true, as well as the opportunity to secure correct information, and the absence of prepossessions" could rarely produce an accurate report then true testimony is only a rare exception (187).  In this case, the way humans process and recall information is the source of challenge for historians.

            Collingwood also addresses the issues that arise from human processing, but he instead focuses on the processes of the historian.  After recounting a literary style murder mystery, he begins to contrast two types, and therefore two different mindsets, of historians.  The first mind set is that of a "scissors-and-paste" historian.  Here the historian researches periods of history, learning the statements left by those who went before.  Collingwood identifies this as one of the difficulties of being a scissors-and-paste historian.  By only reasserting the previous statements of others, this historian cannot call himself a scientific thinker (52).  Another dilemma that faces historians of this type is the overwhelming amount of evidence that is available.  If the historians goal was merely to sort through previous information it would be impossible for them to accomplish this considering the amount of research that is available in our day and age. "Scientific" historians, on the other hand, create their own statements by asking questions of the evidence that is before them.  Instead of only gathering previous information, this historian can hold the title of scientific thinker because of the investigative questions they use to "devise tortures under which [nature] can no longer hold her tongue" (47).  This style of thinking can produce challenges also, however, as there is no exact formula of questions one can use to "torture" the answers from nature.  As a result the wrong questions can be asked, as was demonstrated by the constable in Collingwood's John Doe murder mystery, which results in incorrect or unhelpful answers.  Even with this challenge Collingwood clearly places the scientific historian above the scissors-and-paste historian.  The challenge of a misplaced question can be easily corrected and learned from, while the limitations that face the scissors-and-paste historians are much more difficult to overcome.  Regardless of the way they are viewed, both historian types that Collingwood presents face challenges because of their thought processes. 

            With the different types of challenges presented for both the historian and the witness it seems as though the task of recreating history would be a daunting and nearly impossible one.  We do, however, have records that we treat as historical fact.  We even base life or death decisions on those same witness accounts.  How can this be when they seem to be wrought with so much error?

            I think the answer lies with Collingwood's scientific historian.  I can't possibly pretend to know what it takes to be a historian, but based on Collingwood's description of the questioning that takes place I believe it is possible for truth to be discerned.  He notes that it is important for a historian to know themselves very well before they try to learn from others.  This allows them to know the biases and motives behind the questions they ask and the answers they search for.  If historians are able to understand this about themselves it would seem logical to believe they could also discern certain things about their witnesses.  Jerome notes how any witness can be either very reliable or completely inaccurate depending on the situation and the role they play in it.  By applying the skills of the scientific historian one can hope to recognize which witnesses are reliable and they can still find ways to learn from those they deem unreliable if they find the right questions to ask.  Just as the facts don't always matter in politics, maybe the witness doesn't always matter in history, so long as the historian has the skills and experience necessary to determine the kind of witness they are dealing with. 

 

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